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The strengths and limitations of empirical
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KA Strong, W Lipworth and I Kerridge*
The past two decades have been witness to an “empirical turn” in bioethics.
Whereas once this field of study concerned itself purely with theoretical
analysis of ethical issues emerging in the design and delivery of health care,
increasingly bioethics has embraced a range of empirical research methods
from the social sciences and humanities. The emergence of “empirical
bioethics” has, however, been the subject of enormous debate, both in regard
to its methods and its purpose. For the most part these criticisms fail to
appreciate the assumptions that underpin empirical bioethics or misrepresent
the claims that are made about its moral utility. This article provides a brief
account of the assumptions, strengths and limitations of empirical bioethics.
MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS
Moral philosophy is often subcategorised into metaethics, normative ethics, and applied or practical
ethics – the last-mentioned including bioethics, environmental ethics, business ethics and legal ethics.
Normative ethics and metaethics primarily rely on philosophical reasoning to determine how moral
agents should act and behave and to delineate moral concepts and the nature of justification in moral
theory.1 In contrast, practical ethics and particularly bioethics may use empirical research methods
from the social sciences and humanities not to describe how the world ought to be, but to describe the
social world as it is.2 It is thus “a form of descriptive ethics, focused on describing a particular state of
affairs that has some moral or ethical relevance”.3 In recent years there has been considerable interest
in this type of inquiry, sometimes called the “empirical turn” in bioethics.4
Empirical studies have been conducted in many spheres of biomedicine in which ethical and legal
issues arise, including euthanasia/physician-assisted suicide;5 advanced care planning; end-of-life
decision-making; withdrawal of treatment;6 reproduction; abortion;7 and genetic testing.8 These
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studies, which are now an established feature of the ethical, medical, legal and social science
literature,9 use a range of different qualitative and quantitative methods.
Studies of the attitudes of public and/or professional groups regarding various ethical concerns
have tended to favour quantitative methods, particularly surveys, to further claims of generalisability.
For example, one study on the attitudes of physicians and the general public towards withdrawal of
treatment upon a patient’s request in order to hasten their death utilised postal questionnaires mailed to
1,200 physicians and 1,202 individuals in Sweden.10 The findings from this study revealed strong
public and professional support for a patient’s right to request the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatments – a finding that directly challenged the professional guidelines in Sweden that forbid
physicians from participating in actions that hasten death. These findings led the authors to suggest
that honouring a competent patient’s wishes, even where doing so could be termed “euthanasia”, may
not be considered ethically unacceptable.
An example of a qualitative study that was used to inform ethical and legal deliberation was a
study of the views of lay and expert stakeholders of biobanking using in-depth, semi-structured
interviews to qualitatively examine the perceived trustworthiness of biobankers and their institutions
and the impact that this had on decisions about participation in biobanking.11 This study found that
although there was an assumption of public mistrust within the literature on biobanking,12 academic
biobankers, scientists and their respective institutions were actually perceived as highly trustworthy by
members of the general public. The conclusion of the authors was that this suggested that consent
requirements should recognise the importance of trust, and that research institutions should emphasise
transparency and communication rather than narrow project-specific consent.
Other empirical studies published in the Journal of Law and Medicine that have informed
ethico-legal discourse and the critique and/or development of practices, policies, regulation and
legislation include an assessment of the communication and education needs of key stakeholders in the
assisted reproductive technology industry (in vitro fertilisation clinic staff),13 a study of nurses’
attitudes towards, and knowledge of, legislation mandating the reporting of child abuse and neglect,14
and an exploration of the usefulness of advance directives for palliative care patients.15
Although there are various approaches to empirical ethics, broadly speaking all are based on a
number of common assumptions.16 First, that ethically meaningful information can be gained from the
study of people’s expressed attitudes, moral beliefs, intuitions, reasoning and behaviour. Secondly, that
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a range of research methods from the social sciences and humanities provide a way to access this
information, including historical study, literary scholarship, surveys and other population-based
methods, experimental methods, and qualitative empirical methods such as interviews, focus groups
and observation. Thirdly, that empirical approaches to bioethics cannot be defined by a single
methodology but rather by an intellectual commitment to using the findings from empirical research in
ethical reflection and decision-making. And finally, that the primary outcome of empirical data is not
the generation of moral truths or norms, but engagement with a particular ethical issue in a practical
and direct way.
The strength of empirical research in bioethics is that it allows for:
• the description of the experience of individuals or populations with respect to morally relevant
issues;17
• the description of the attitudes, beliefs, moral opinions, reasoning patterns and decision-making of
those involved in a certain practice;18
• the generation of data which can challenge authority, dogma, convention, norms and experience
by showing how practice varies;19 and
• the identification of moral issues that have escaped the attention of ethicists, but are relevant in a
specific context, including those that are not obvious because they are embedded in practice.20
Thus, empirical research may enrich normative arguments21 and make ethical discourse more context
sensitive and comprehensive.22 This, in turn, may inform moral discourses and the formulation of
policy, regulation and legislation.23
CRITIQUES OF EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS
While there are acknowledged benefits of using empirical research methods in bioethics, a number of
criticisms have been raised against empirical bioethics. The first relates to the quality of empirical
research conducted under the rubric of bioethics, including concerns about study design, method and
validity. These concerns are, however, not specific to bioethics but relate to the design, conduct,
analysis and translation of research in any setting.24 The second concern is that the empirical turn in
bioethics risks obscuring normative content by generating seemingly “neutral facts”.25 In other words,
that over-emphasis on data may diminish the attention given to philosophical analysis. The third
criticism is metaethical, and relates to what data are, and how they relate to the development of moral
norms. Much of this debate involves claims that empirical ethics disregards the “is–ought” gap,
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commits the naturalistic fallacy, and/or violates the fact–value distinction.26 In general, the argument
is that while empirical ethics can map the moral domain and tell us how people behave, it “cannot
generate normativity or determine what is good or evil, right or wrong”.27
To some extent, these criticisms misunderstand both empirical bioethics and moral philosophy
and misrepresent what empirical bioethics claims to do.28 Normative ethics inevitably draws upon
assumptions and evidence about the world, human nature and behaviour, while empirical ethics
describes aspects of the world that are, in turn, value laden and socially constructed.29 And while
supporters of empirical bioethics point to its value in informing the development of moral norms, in
general they do not argue that empirical data, in itself, is sufficient for the generation of normative
claims.30 The final critique of empirical bioethics relates to the lack of clarity as to how one translates
the findings of empirical research into normative theory or the generation of moral norms. A number
of different approaches have been described for integrating empirical research and normative ethics,
with some prioritising moral theory and others empirical data.31 Ives and Draper describe one such
approach, which they call “normative policy or practice oriented bioethics” (NPOB).32 This approach
“seeks to make normative judgments, requires the incorporation of moral theory and philosophical
reasoning to produce rigorous and consistent ethical analysis, and yet it also requires empirical work”
to practically situate the issues that are in question.33 While approaches like NPOB have intuitive
appeal, the degree to which they can truly guide action or policy is open to question and it remains
unclear how empirical data can or should be integrated into normative theory, how much weight it
should be given when it contradicts philosophical reasoning and how far the moral obligation extends
(if indeed there is one) to collect and consider empirical data.
CONCLUSION
The importance of empirical research in bioethics is that it may reveal clinical, legal, emotional and
philosophical factors influencing decision-making. While moral theory and careful philosophical
analysis is fundamental to consideration of bioethical issues, without attention to empirical data such
analysis may misunderstand certain details of specific practices or decisions and/or omit some factors
which have considerable moral relevance.34 Empirical research cannot, of course, replace
philosophical analysis and cannot generate normativity. But what it can do is elucidate the attitudes,
experiences, values and processes involved in decision-making and so enable the construction of
policy and law, the critique of moral norms and the appreciation of the experience of those faced with
issues raised by bioethically contentious topics.
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